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Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets 
Laurent Granier† and Sébastien Trinquard‡ 
October 20, 2010 
 
Abstract 
In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the 
generic firm, Zentiva. This paper fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning 
mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their 
market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo-
generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics 
production as a mergers’ catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an 
incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this paper is that the brand-name 
laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In 
some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is 
then a predatory strategy. 
JEL classification: I11, L12.   
Keywords: Mergers, Pharmaceutical Market, Predation, Pseudo-Generics. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the pharmaceutical market, drug producers apply for patents in order to protect 
their intellectual property rights. At the patents expiration date, these rights become 
public property. The production of generic goods, manufactured with the same 
molecules as the brand-name drugs, can then start to compete with the original product. 
Generic drugs are certified to be "therapeutically equivalent" to the originator’s product. 
But, for consumers, they may still vary in characteristics such as shape, color, flavor, 
scoring, packaging, labelling, shelf life and brand loyalty.1 Therefore, these goods are 
not considered as perfect substitutes. The generics market development is an answer 
from insurers2 to the increase in drug spending. A lot of papers study this development. 
In particular, Caves and alii (1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Frank and Salkever 
(1992, 1997), Morton (1999, 2000) analyze the effect of generics entry on prices and 
market shares of brand-name products in the United States. However, they do not 
consider pseudo-generics.3 The pseudo-generic is identical to the brand-name product, 
but is marketed as a generic. In Australia and Canada, pseudo-generics have about one 
quarter of the generic market. They are also in a strong position in New Zealand, 
Germany, the UK and Sweden (Hollis, 2002). The significant pseudo-generics 
production explains our interest in this topic. Indeed, this paper analyzes the pseudo-
                                                                                                                                               
 
1
 Due to the trademark protection, the generic manufacturers may not be allowed to produce generic 
versions that have exactly the same apparence as the brand-name originals (Ching, 2000). 
2The development of the generics market is favored by the implementation of a right of substitution, of an 
international nonproprietary name, of formularies, of controls on prescribing doctors and pharmacists, and 
of controls on drug prices, notably. 
3
 In the US, pseudo-generics are also called "authorized generics" (Hollis, 2005). 
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generics production effects on merger strategies. Thus, the paper fill the gap in the 
theoretical literature on mergers between brand-name and generic laboratories. In 
particular, we consider pseudo-generics production as a mergers’ catalyst. Some simple 
stylized facts suggest that the topic addressed in this paper is potentially highly relevant 
for the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, we observe mergers between brand companies 
producing pseudo-generics and generic firms: in 2002, Novartis whose generic 
subsidiary is Sandoz, acquires Lek, then Sabex and Duranscan in 2004; in 2009, Sanofi-
Aventis, whose subsidiary is Winthrop merges with Zentiva. Merger incentives are 
empirically validated (Scott Morton, 2002). 
The economists’ interest in pseudo-generics effect on the pharmaceutical market 
is recent, both at an empirical and theoretical level. At the empirical level, Hollis (2002) 
is the first paper to consider the effect of pseudo-generics on prices and generics entry. 
He shows the presence of a first mover advantage. This advantage deters entry and leads 
to the increase in prices, both for pseudo-generics and brand-name products. Hollis 
(2002, 2005) concludes that the welfare decreases on the Canadian market. At the 
theoretical level, Ferrandiz (1999) analyzes the decision to produce pseudo-generics in a 
market where branded goods are perfect substitutes and where there exists a degree of 
product differentiation between brand-name drugs and generics. He shows in a model, 
via simulation outcomes, that it is better for a brand-name firm to produce pseudo-
generics than to accept the entry of the generic firm. The brand-name firm takes this 
decision in order to increase the brand-name price4 and its global profit, owing to a 
market segmentation effect. On the other hand, Kong and Seldon (2004) use a two-stage 
game model with product differentiation. They find that, if the cross-price effect 
                                                                                                                                               
 
4Frank and Salkever (1992) is the first paper modelizing the price increase of the branded good when the 
 4 
between the brand-name product and its generic equivalent is sufficiently large, the 
brand-name incumbent produces the pseudo-generic drug, increasing its profit and 
deterring generic entry.5 From a policy perspective, the results of this research imply 
that: either the pseudo-generic should be banned, or a period without pseudo-generic 
should be guaranteed to the first generic firm6 (Hollis, 2003). This perspective would 
justify our merger study. So, we note the presence of generic firms in pharmaceutical 
markets. Moreover, the merger cases already cited in this introduction show entry 
deterrence study can be completed by a merger study. The following framework, 
allowing to analyze merger incentives, explain a concrete fact.  
To our knowledge, few theoretical papers analyze mergers between brand-name 
and generic laboratories. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap. In particular, we 
consider pseudo-generics production as a merger catalyst. In other words, we study how 
merger stategies can influence pseudo-generics production. We modelize an industry in 
which a brand-name firm and a generic firm7 compete à la Cournot. Brand-name and 
generic goods are considered as imperfect substitutes. This model presents a two-stage 
non-cooperative game. At each stage, the brand-name firm can purchase its generic 
competitor. But, in the first stage, the brand-name firm can decide to produce pseudo-
generics instead. In this framework, the generic laboratory is a Stackelberg leader on the 
generic market where two homogeneous goods are available: generic and pseudo-
generic products. The pseudo-generics production at the initial stage reduces the cost of 
                                                                                                                                               
generic drug enters in the pharmaceutical market. 
5For comments about Kong and Seldon’s (2004) propositions, see Rodrigues (2006) and Kong and Seldon 
(2006). 
6In the United States, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, guaranteed a period of six months of exclusivity from 
the date it starts marketing its generic drug. This patent is set up to favour the generic entry (OECD, 
2001). 
7
 Indeed, we assume an only one generic firm. Most of the time, trere are a lot of generic firms in a 
therapeutical class. But qualitatively, our results are robust if several generic manufacturers are initially 
present and if there is a pattern of future entries. 
 5 
the merger at the second stage. Indeed, the competition increases and lowers the 
purchase price of the generic firm. We find three results. First, without pseudo-generics, 
the brand-name producer always monopolizes the market. Second, the pseudo-generics 
production may delay the takeover. Indeed, under some conditions, the "delayed" 
merger dominates the first period merger. Third, the brand-name company can produce 
pseudo-generics solely to monopolize the industry, even if it is not profitable at first. 
Indeed, under some market conditions, the pseudo-generics production reduces the 
brand-name firm’s profit, but this firm nonetheless decides to produce this pseudo-
generic in order to lower the purchase price of the generic manufacturer. Two 
conditions must be satisfied to insure the profitability of this strategy: the loss incurred 
by the pseudo-generics production over a period must not be too significant. Moreover, 
the discounted value of the gain associated with the reduction in the purchase price must 
be high enough. In this situation, pseudo-generics production must be analyzed as a 
predatory strategy. In the predation literature, most of papers analyze predatory pricing. 
By this way, Saloner (1987) analyzes mergers in a predation context. Contrary to 
Saloner (1987), in our paper, the predation is provoked by pseudo-generics production. 
In our paper, we extend Kong and Seldon (2004). The latter is the only paper 
concerning both anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical market and pseudo-
generics production. Our treatment differs on two points. On one hand, we consider that 
the generic product enters before the pseudo-generic product, and so, benefits from the 
generic market leadership8 (Grabowsky and Vernon, 1992). On the other hand, the 
monopolization of the pharmaceutical market can thus take place only by mergers 
                                                                                                                                               
 
8Grabowski and Vernon (1992) examined data on 18 major orally-administrated drug products subject to 
generic competition between 1983 and 1987 and these data are consistent with the hypothesis of first-
mover advantages in generic drug markets. 
 6 
because the generic product is present in the market before the pseudo-generic product. 
So, we study mergers and not barriers to entry, contrary to Kong and Seldon (2004).  
The rest of the paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 sets up the basic 
model. Section 3 shows how merger incentives are modified with the pseudo-generic 
entry. In section 4, we analyze effects of merger strategies on pseudo-generics 
production. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Basic model 
 
Firstly, we present the assumptions of the model. Then, we study the benchmark. 
We start by investigating the conditions under which the duopolistic situation is 
sustainable, assuming that pseudo-generics can not be produced. In this framework, we 
complete the study by analyzing the incentives to merge.  
 
2.1 Assumptions 
 
We study a two-firm industry in which a brand-name laboratory and a generic 
firm compete à la Cournot. By assumption, the price-elasticity in the generic market is 
higher than the price-elasticity in the branded market as in Frank et Salkever (1992). 
The utility results from the satisfaction obtained from the consumption of the quantity 
bq  of brand-name goods and the quantity GQ  of its generic substitute, with 
G g pgQ q q= + . Note that gq  is the generic quantity and pgq  is the pseudo-generic 
quantity. We assume that, for consumers, generic and pseudo-generic goods are 
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homogeneous (Hollis, 2002). In a compromise between generality and tractability, we 
assume, as Kong and Seldon (2004), that the quadratic utility function of the 
representative consumer9 is the following one: 
 
 
0
2 2
0
( )
1 ( 2 ).
2
b G
b b G G b b G G
U V U q Q
V q Q q q Q Qζ ζ α γ β
= + ,
= + + − + +
 (1) 
 
where 0V  reflects the utility derived from a competitive numeraire sector. We 
assume 0bζ > , 0Gζ > , 0α > , 0β > , 0γ > , and α β<  to take into account the 
preference for brand-name products. To simplify and without loss of generality, we 
normalize the size of the market to unity, i.e 1G bζ ζ= = . To ensure the concavity of 
utility and profit functions, we assume 2αβ γ> . 2γαβ  expresses the degree of product 
differentiation, ranging from 0 for independent goods to 1 for perfect substitutes (as 
α β< , we often compare α  and γ  to analyze product differentiation). From (1), one 
can derive linear inverse demand relations: 
 
 1G G b
G
Up Q qQ β γ
∂
= = − − ,
∂
 (2) 
 1b b G
b
Up q Q
q
α γ∂= = − − .
∂
 (3) 
 
Finally, we assume that there is no production cost. This assumption makes it 
easier to capture the product differentiation effects on firms’ strategies. Furthermore, we 
                                                 
9The representative consumer is a physician, considered as a perfect agent for his or her patients. 
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assume no entry threats.10 Nevertheless, if we consider entries, entry deterrence holds 
by introducing fixed costs in the model. In this framework, if potential entrants have 
fixed costs above a computable threshold, our results hold. Moreover, this threshold is 
all the more low because, once the merger achieved, pseudo-generics are generally 
produced. Therefore, entry is even less encouraged (Kong and Seldon, 2004).  
 
2.2 Duopoly without pseudo-generic products 
 
We study the conditions under which the duopolistic situation is sustainable, 
assuming that pseudo-generics can not be produced. We assume that a brand-name 
laboratory and a generic firm compete à la Cournot. Let DbΠ  be the brand-name firm’s 
profit function and DgΠ  be the generic laboratory’s profit function. Note that G gQ q=  in 
this case. We derive the equilibrium outputs from the first order conditions (see 
appendix A): 
 
 2
2
4
D
gq
α γ
αβ γ
∗ −
= .
−
 (4) 
 2
2
4
D
bq
β γ
αβ γ
∗ −
= .
−
 (5) 
 
Remark 1  The duopoly exists if product differentiation is high enough ( 2γ α< ).  
                                                 
10Our model is not a model of entry since we do not focus on entry deterrence. Many endogenous mergers 
models (see for instance Kamien and Zang, 1990) proceed in the same way. Once a firm entered the 
market, the settle costs are paid. Moreover, pseudo-generics may be manufactured on the same production 
lines as their name-brand equivalents. Because of these two reasons, we assume no fixed costs. However, 
our results are robust from a threshold of fixed costs if we assume such costs. 
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On the brand-name market, if product differentiation is not too high ( 2γ α> ), the 
own-price effect on the brand-name product is very low compared to the own-price 
effect on the generic product and to the cross-price effect. Therefore, brand-name goods 
are produced in very large quantities. Thus, the price is negative in the generic market 
and the generic firm has no incentive to produce. We derive the equilibrium profits: 
 
 
 
2
2 2
(2 )
(4 )
D
b
α β γ
αβ γ
∗ −Π = .
−
 (6) 
 
2
2 2
(2 )
(4 )
D
g
β α γ
αβ γ
∗ −Π = .
−
 (7) 
 
2.3 Merger without pseudo-generic products 
 
Here, we are interested in the possibility that the brand firm acquires the generic 
firm in order to monopolize the market.11 Thus, the following non-cooperative game is 
played: the brand-name firm chooses between two events. Either merge with the generic 
firm, or stay in the duopolistic industry. We call status quo this second event (see figure 
1 for the extended form of the game).  
                                                 
11Two reasons rule out the possibility that the generic firm initiate the takeover. First, no generic firm 
bought back a brand-name firm to this day. Second, it is easier for the brand-name firm to initiate the 
takeover. Indeed, it benefited from a monopolistic situation thanks to its patent and because of the brand-
name demand inelasticity. 
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In this game, the brand-name firm makes a bid for the generic firm. The generic 
firm gives a reservation price below which it refuses to be sold. If the bid is superior or 
equal to the reservation price, the brand-name laboratory purchases the generic firm. 
Otherwise, the status quo is equilibrium of this game. We look for the Nash equilibrium 
of this game. Therefore, we determine the incentives to merge. Firstly, we study the 
monopoly profit. Indeed, the merger incentive depends on the difference between the 
monopoly profit and the merger costs.  
 
2.3.1 The monopoly, goal of the merger 
 
In order to determine the equilibrium of the game, we need the monopoly profit 
function. Indeed, the merger leads to this market structure. In the previous section, we 
showed that a de facto monopoly exists if and only if the product differentiation is not 
too high ( 2γ α> ). For a brand-name market price-sensitivity below this threshold 
( 2γ α> ), the generic firm exits the market. The monopoly can also exist because of a 
merger. This is possible if product differentiation is high enough ( 2γ α< ).  
 11 
Let us study the case where the branded firm has a monopoly power and produces 
generics (pseudo-generics). Let us note its profit MbΠ . We derive the equilibrium 
outputs from the first order conditions (see appendix B): 
 
 2
1
2
M
bq
β γ
αβ γ
∗ −
= .
−
 (8) 
 2
1
2
M
gq
α γ
αβ γ
∗ −
= .
−
 (9) 
 
We derive the equilibrium profits: 
 
 2
1 2
4
M
b
β γ α
αβ γ
∗ − +Π = .
−
 (10) 
If product differentiation is not too high (α γ< ), the monopoly produces 
exclusively brand-name goods. Let MMbΠ  be its profit function. We derive the 
equilibrium output from the first order condition (see appendix C): 
 
 
1
2
MM
bq α
∗
= .  (11) 
 
We derive the equilibrium profit: 
 
 
1
4
MM
b α
∗Π = .  (12) 
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Remark 2  If product differentiation is high enough (γ α< ), the monopoly 
produces brand-name and generic goods. Indeed, inter-market competition is not too 
intensive.  
 
Intuitively, if product differentiation is not too high (γ α> ), the own-price effect 
in the brand-name market is lower than the own-price effect in the generic market and 
the cross-price effect. Thus, there is no incentive to produce generics. Indeed, to 
produce generics would decrease the monopoly profit earned on the brand-name 
product. Moreover, the profit earned on the generic product would not compensate this 
loss.  
 
2.3.2 Merger incentive 
 
In order to determine brand-name firm’s merger incentive, we compare its merger 
payoff and its status quo payoff. Let 1( )α β γΣ , ,  be the merger gain and 1( )σ α β γ, ,  the 
opportunity cost lost by the firm when it merges, i.e the status quo payoff.  
The merger gain is the difference between the monopoly profit and the buying 
price. According to the range of demand parameters, there are two monopoly profit 
functions (see section 2.3.1). The takeover takes place if and only if the brand-name 
firm’s bid is superior or equal to the reservation price. The generic firm always sets the 
same reservation price, equal to its duopoly profit.12 Indeed, we assume that it can not 
ask more because, refusing to sell, it realizes this duopoly profit. In order to simplifly 
                                                 
12The unique strategy of the generic firm is to give an asking price equal to Dg
∗Π . 
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the analysis, we assume that a bid equal to the reservation price makes the generic firm 
indifferent between whether to proceed with the sale or not. In this case, it chooses to be 
sold. Thus, in order to merge, the brand-name firm makes a bid equal to the reservation 
price, i.e generic firm’s duopoly profit. In the merger case, the purchase price is then 
equal to the duopoly profit. The merger gain is:  
 
 1
in the case where( ) 2
in the case where
MM D
b g
M D
b g
γ
α γ
α β γ
α γ
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
Π − Π < < .Σ , , = 
 Π − Π > .
 (13) 
 
Concerning the opportunity cost, it is equal to profit given up by the brand-name 
firm when the latter decides to merge, i.e its duopoly profit (status quo): 
 
 1( ) Dbσ α β γ ∗, , = Π .  (14) 
 
Therefore, there is an incentive to merge if and only if: 
 
 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0F α β γ α β γ σ α β γ, , = Σ , , − , , ≥ .  (15) 
 
We show that ( )0F α β γ, ,  for 2γα β ∈ ,  .  
Proof. see appendix D.    
 
Remark 3  In the duopoly case, the merger always takes place. We claim that the 
equilibrium of this game is the merger situation.  
 
 14 
The monoplization leads to an increase in market power and then to an increase in 
profits. This compensates for generic firm’s buying price. Indeed, if the goods were 
homogeneous, the market power gain would be higher than the loss related to the 
buying price (Kamien and Zang, 1990). In our study, goods are not perfect substitutes. 
Thus, there is a drop in the merger gain since the generic market is more sensitive to 
price. But, on the other hand, generic firm’s buying price also decreases since generic 
firm’s profit is lower than if this firm produces the homogeneous product. This shows 
that results of Kamien and Zang (1990) are robust if one takes away the perfectly 
substitutable goods assumption. Now, we show that pseudo-generics production 
possibility may modify incentives to merge.  
 
3 Pseudo-generic and "delayed" merger 
 
In this section, we consider that the brand-name laboratory can produce a pseudo-
generic good. We study incentives to merge within this framework. If a takeover takes 
place after pseudo-generics production, it is called "delayed" merger. The brand-name 
firm maximizes the sum of its profit earned on brand-name goods and its profit earned 
on pseudo-generic goods. In this case, we recall that G g pgQ q q= +  where gq  is the 
generic output and pgq  the pseudo-generic output and that, for consumers, generic and 
pseudo-generic goods are homogeneous (Hollis, 2002). In the rest of the paper, we call 
"pseudo-duopoly" the industry structure in which the brand-name firm produces 
pseudo-generics.  
For the benchmark case, we showed that the brand-name firm monopolizes the 
industry. Another strategy is now possible: the brand-name firm can produce pseudo-
 15 
generic goods. Consequently, we consider a second step: having produced pseudo-
generics during the first production period, the brand-name firm can either continue to 
produce pseudo-generics, or merge with the generic firm. Therefore, we consider a two-
stage game:  
In the first stage, there are three states of the world: the two previous states (i.e the 
merger and the status quo) and a new one in which the brand-name firm decides to 
produce pseudo-generics. After this stage, a production period takes place. In the second 
stage, if the brand-name produced pseudo-generics, two states of the world are 
available: merger or pseudo-duopoly13. Otherwise, the industry structure does not 
change. After this stage, competition takes place on an infinite horizon.  
 
We solve backward the non-cooperative game in order to compute sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). In the second stage of the game, we determine the sub-
game equilibrium: we find the equilibrum between to merge or not, pseudo-generics 
production being decided at the first stage (section 3.2). Finally, we find the SPNE of 
the game (section 3.3). In order to solve the game, we previously determine the pseudo-
duopoly profit functions (section 3.1).  
                                                 
13After pseudo-generics production, the merger can only take place at the second stage of the game (see 
section 3.3 for more details). 
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3.1 Pseudo-generics production 
 
We have to study the market structure in which the brand-name firm produces 
pseudo-generics: the pseudo-duopoly structure. Indeed, the two firms compete à la 
Cournot but the brand-name firm produces two drugs: brand-name and pseudo-generic 
goods. Obviously, the generic firm produces the generic good. Furthermore, the generic 
is present in the market before the pseudo-generic firm’s entry, thus benefiting from the 
first mover advantage (Grabowsky and Vernon, 1992). This advantage confers on it the 
generic market leadership. So, we talk about Cournot-Stackelberg competition in this 
pseudo-duopolistic industry14. Let PgΠ  be generic laboratory’s profit and 
P
bΠ  be brand-
name laboratory’s profit.  
To compute the equilibrium profits, it is necessary to determine the reaction 
function ( )b gRF q q,  concerning pseudo-generics (see appendix E). Substituting 
                                                 
14Our results are robusts to the competition à la Cournot-Nash, and moreover, if the leader of the generic 
market is the brand-name firm. Indeed, these assumptions do not provide any qualitatively different 
results. 
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( )b gRF q q,  in both profit functions, we derive the equilibrium outputs from the first 
order conditions: 
 
 
1
2
P
gq β
∗
= .  (16) 
 2
1
2
P
bq
β γ
αβ γ
∗ −
= .
−
 (17) 
 
Substituting (16) and (17) in ( )b gRF q q, , we derive the pseudo-generics 
equilibrium output:  
 
 
2
2
1 2
4 ( )
P
pgq
αβ γβ γ
β αβ γ
∗ − +
= .
−
 (18) 
 
We deduce the equilibrium profits: 
 
 
1
8
P
g β
∗Π = .  (19) 
 
2 2
2
1 4 8 3
16
P
b
αβ β γβ γ
β αβ γ
∗
 
 
 
+ − +Π = .
−
 (20) 
 
The pseudo-duopoly exists if the pseudo-generics equilibrium output is positive. 
This is the case if: 
 
 
(2 )( ) with ( )A A γ β γα β γ β γ β
−
> , , , = .  (21) 
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To solve for SPNE of the game, we compute the sub-game equilibrium of the 
second stage. In particular, we determine the merger incentive in the pseudo-duopolistic 
structure.  
 
3.2 Second stage: merger incentive in the pseudo-duopoly market 
 
We study incentives to merge in the case where the industry is initially pseudo-
duopolistic. These incentives change compared to the duopoly case. In this framework, 
the brand-name producer chooses between two events. It can merge or stay in the same 
market structure. In the first case, it monopolizes the market and produces brand-name 
goods and generics because the product differentiation is high enough (α γ> : see 
remark 2). Indeed, the pseudo-duopoly structure can exist only if ( )Aα β γ> , . 
Moreover, ( )A β γ γ, > . The generic firm chooses between two strategies: to accept the 
buying price or to reject it. This firm always sets a reservation price equal to its profit in 
the status quo case, i.e its pseudo-duopoly profit ( Pg∗Π ). In order to merge, we assume 
that the brand-name firm has only to make a bid equal to the reservation price of the 
generic firm.  
The brand-name firm has an incentive to acquire the generic producer if its merger 
gain is higher than its opportunity cost. Let 2 ( )α β γΣ , ,  be the merger gain:  
 
 2 ( ) M Pb gα β γ δ ∗ ∗Σ , , , = Π − Π .  (22) 
 
 19 
Let 2 ( )σ α β γ δ, , ,  be the opportunity cost. In other words, it is about brand-name 
firm’s profit when this firm does not merge (status quo):  
 
 2 ( ) Pbσ α β γ δ ∗, , , = Π .  (23) 
 
Thus, the merger incentive exists if and only if: 
 
 2 2( ) ( ) 01
M P P
b g bα β γ δ σ α β γ δ δ
∗ ∗ ∗Π − Π − Π
Σ , , , − , , , = ≥ .
−
 (24) 
 
The condition (24) is always verified15, thus:  
 
Remark 4  In the pseudo-duopoly regime, the merger always takes place.  
 
We claim that the Nash equilibrium of this sub-game is the merger situation. The 
merger is possible whatever the demand parameters are. The buying price of the generic 
firm is lower in the pseudo-duopoly regime than in the duopoly regime because the 
generic firm is directly competed against. Indeed, generic and pseudo-generic goods are 
perfect substitutes. Given the sub-game equilibrium found in this section, we turn to the 
first stage of the game to compute the SPNE.  
 
3.3 First stage: the "Delayed" merger incentive 
 
                                                 
15Indeed, 116 0
M P P
b g b β
∗ ∗ ∗Π − Π − Π = > . 
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Relative to section 2, a new path is analyzed. In section 3.2, we solved the sub-
game of the second stage. Whatever demand parameters are selected, there is an unique 
Nash equilibrium: the monopolization of the pseudo-duopoly industry. Therefore, the 
new path to study is the "delayed" merger (i.e to merge after having produced pseudo-
generics). For the brand-name laboratory, the sole interest in this path is to reduce the 
purchase price of the generic firm. Nevertheless, the brand-name firm gives up the 
monopoly profit during a production period. Indeed, it would earn the monopoly profit 
at once by merging before the first production period.16 
We determined the equilibrium of the second stage in the case where the pseudo-
generic drug has been produced at the first stage. Without pseudo-generics, the merger 
event dominates the status quo event. Thus, there is always monopolization (see section 
2.3). In order to find the SPNE of the two-stage game, we must compare two branches 
of the game tree: either the merger at the beginning of the game, or the "delayed" 
merger.  
The repurchase mechanism is the same as previously. Here, the takeover takes 
place at the beginning of the second period. We study this new path. The brand-name 
firm makes a bid for the generic firm. The latter gives a reservation price below which it 
rejects the offer. If the bid is superior or equal to the reservation price, the takeover 
takes place. As there is a two-stage game and as the horizon is infinite, payoffs must 
take into account the rate of discount δ .17 
In this section, we determine the "delayed" merger gain. This is the payoff earned 
by the brand name firm, following this merger path. This path can be analyzed in two 
                                                 
16Without merger, we exclude pseudo-generics production for more than one period. Indeed, the generic 
firm’s buying price is constant once the pseudo-generic good is produced. Moreover, by merging later, 
the brand-name firm gives up the monopoly profit for a longer time. 
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steps because there is a change between the first production period and the following 
ones. During the first period, the brand-name firm earns a pseudo-duopoly profit. After, 
it gets a monopoly profit18 for an infinite horizon. In order to merge, the brand-name 
firm has to pay the generic firm’s pseudo-duopoly profit for the following periods. Let 
3( )α β γ δΣ , , ,  be the "delayed" merger gain:  
 
 3( ) 1 1
PM
gP b
b
δδ
α β γ δ δ δ
∗∗
∗
ΠΠΣ , , , = Π + − .
− −
 (25) 
 
In the rest of the paper, the first stage merger is called "standard" merger. In 
section 2.3, we showed that the "standard" merger is preferred to the status quo. Thus, 
we have to compare the "delayed" merger gain and the "standard" merger gain. Note 
that, in the previous section, we computed the "standard" merger gain in a static 
framework and for a high enough level of product differentiation ( 2γα > , see equality 
(13)). Now, we restrict the range of parameters because pseudo-generics production 
may exist only if ( )Aα β γ> , . Moreover, as the horizon is infinite, the "standard" 
merger gain is the discounted infinite flow of monopoly profit minus the buying price 
(i.e the infinite flow of generic firm’s duopoly profit). Therefore, we compare the 
"delayed" merger gain and the discounted infinite flow of "standard" merger gain 
( 1 ( )1α β γδΣ , ,− ), with ( )Aα β γ> , . Let ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  be the difference between these two 
gains:  
 
1
3
( )( ) ( )
1 1 1
D P
g gP M
b bS
δα β γ
α β γ δ α β γ δ δ δ δ
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
Π ΠΣ , ,
, , , = Σ , , , − = Π − Π + − .
− − −
 (26) 
                                                                                                                                               
17 1
1 rδ += , with r  the interest rate. 
18The pseudo-generic good may be produced only if ( )Aα β γ> , . Thus, ( )A β γ γ, > . We deduce that 
α γ>  in this framework. Therefore, the monopoly produces two substituable goods. 
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If ( ) 0S α β γ δ, , , > , then the "delayed" merger is SPNE of the game. Let us detail 
( )S α β γ δ, , , . Note ( ) M Pb bc β ∗ ∗= Π − Π =  316β . This is the cost due to the "delayed" 
merger compared to the "standard" merger. This cost is borne during the first period. 
Note 1 1( )
D P
g gg δδ δα β γ δ
∗ ∗Π Π
− −
, , , = − . This is the decrease in the purchase price associated with 
the "delayed" merger event. Indeed, instead of paying the discounted infinite flow of the 
generic firm’s duopoly profit from the beginning, the brand-name firm pays, at the 
second stage, the discounted infinite flow of the generic firm’s pseudo-duopoly profit.  
 
Proposition 1  The "delayed" merger is the SPNE of this game if and only if:  
(i) the own-price effect for the brand-name product is relatively high,  
(ii) the own-price effect for the generic product is rather strong compared to the 
cross-price effect,  
(iii) the rate of discount is sufficiently high (i.e ( )δ δ α β γ> , , ).  
 
Proof. We show that ( ) 0S α β γ δ, , , >  for :  
- 2 ( )α α β γ> , ,  
-
21
2 2( )β γ> + ,  
- ( ) 1δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,   , with 
2 2 2 2 4 2 2
22
16 64 24 3 16
4
( ) β α β γ βγ α γ β γ
αβ γ
δ α β γ                
 
 
 
− + − + −
−
, , = .  
For more details, see appendix F for the study of ( )c β  and the study of 
( )g α β γ δ, , , . See also appendix G for the study of ( )S α β γ δ, , , .    
Intuitively, if the own-price effect for the brand-name product is relatively high, 
then the "delayed" merger gain increases compared to the "standard" merger gain. 
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Indeed, the generic’s firm duopoly profit increases with the brand-name market price-
sensitivity (α ) while the generic’s firm pseudo-duopoly profit is independent of this 
sensitivity. Furthermore, if the generic market price-sensitivity ( β ) is high enough, the 
first period loss due to the "delayed" merger is relatively low. Under these parameter 
conditions, there is a rate of discount high enough such as the earnings of the second 
period (the "delayed" merger purchase price is lower than the "standard" merger one: 
P D
g g
∗ ∗Π < Π ) exceeds the loss of the first period.  
Now, we study how the profitability zone of "delayed" mergers 
( ( ) 1δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,   ) is affected by demand shocks. We show that 
( ) 0δ α β γα
∂ , ,
∂ < , 
( ) 0δ α β γβ
∂ , ,
∂ > , and 
( ) 0δ α β γγ
∂ , ,
∂ > . The proof is given in appendix H. 
   
Remark 5  The "delayed" merger profitability increases (respectively decreases) 
when the brand-name market price-sensitivity (α ) increases, given the generic market 
price-sensitivity ( β ) and the cross price-sensitivity (γ ) (respectively when β  increases 
given α  and γ  or when γ  increases given α  and β ).  
 
Intuitively, the minimum rate of discount permitted to achieve a "delayed" merger 
decreases according to the price-sensitivity increase in the brand-name market, given 
other demand parameters. In other words, this relative increase in the price-sensitivity in 
the brand-name market allows the gain in purchase price due to the "delayed" merger to 
increase. So, the development of this merger gain does not need to be very high to 
compensate for the loss undergone during the first period since the brand-name firm 
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does not merge at the first stage. This means that the "delayed" merger is profitable for 
low rates of discount when the price-sensitivity in the brand-name market is high.  
We show that ( ( ) ) 0δ α β γ β γ, , , = . The proof is given in appendix I. 
 
Remark 6  There exists a threshold ( )α β γ,  (a very high product differentiation) 
such as if ( )α α β γ> , , then ( ) 0δ α β γ, , ≤ . In this extreme case, the "delayed" merger 
takes place whatever the rate of discount is.  
 
4 "Delayed" merger and "Predatory" merger 
 
In this section, we focus on merger strategy effects on pseudo-generics 
production. Therefore, we analyze the pseudo-generics production decision when 
mergers are not considered (section 4.1). Afterwards, relating to mergers, we show there 
is an incentive to produce pseudo-generics that did not previously exist. This merger is 
called "predatory" merger. Indeed, the merger strategy may trigger pseudo-generics’ 
production. Contrary to the predation literature, in our paper, the predation is provoked 
by pseudo-generics production and not by predatory pricing. We conclude this section 
by policy recommandations (section 4.2).  
 
4.1 Comparison of the duopoly and the pseudo-duopoly regimes: 
 
Excluding mergers, we determine under which conditions the brand-name firm 
produces pseudo-generics, and the market, as a consequence, becomes pseudo-
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duopolistic. To find these conditions, we compare brand-name firm’s duopoly and 
pseudo-duopoly profits:  
 
Proposition 2  For a high product differentiation ( ( )α α β γ> , ), the brand-name 
laboratory produces pseudo-generics.  
 
Proof. See appendix J. Moreover,by hypothesis α β< , thus 
 If ( ) then for
2
D P
b b
γ
α β γ β α β∗ ∗  , > Π > Π ∈ , ,     
 
for ( )
2If ( ) then
for ( )
D P
b b
P D
b b
γ
α α β γ
α β γ β
α α β γ β
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
  Π > Π ∈ , , .   , < 
  Π > Π ∈ , , . 
 
 
Remark 7  When 2 ( )Aγα β γ ∈ , ,  , the pseudo-duopoly can not exist and thus the 
duopoly takes place. Finally, for low product differentiation ( 2γ α> ), the generic 
producer is excluded from the industry and the brand-name firm monopolizes the 
market.  
 
The own-price effect for the brand-name product is lower than the own-price 
effect for the generic product, but very low relative to the cross-price effect. The firm 
has an incentive to produce pseudo-generic goods because the increase in profits earned 
on pseudo-generic products compensates for the decrease in profits earned on brand-
name drugs. This is because of the weakness of the cross-price effect.  
 
Summary of the market structure without merger strategy:   
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If ( )β α β γ< , :  
α  values 0……………………….….
2
γ
 
2
γ
……………….…………… β  
Market structure Monoproduct monopoly  Duopoly 
 
Table 1 
 
If ( )β α β γ> , :  
α  values 0……………….
2
γ
 
2
γ
…………….… ( , )α β γ  ( , )α β γ ……………….. β  
Market 
structure 
Monoproduct 
monopoly  
Duopoly Pseudo-duopoly 
 
Table 2 
 
Remark 8  Note19 that ( ) ( )α β γ α β γ, > , . 
 
4.2 "Predatory" merger and competition policy 
 
When a "delayed" merger takes place, the brand-name firm has to produce 
pseudo-generics during the first period. This firm gives up the monopoly profit it would 
have earned, by merging at the first stage of the game. Nevertheless, it buys the generic 
                                                 
19
 ( ) ( )23( ( ) ) 2 2 4 3 2 3 3 0F α α β γ β γ γ γ β β γ β γ= , , , = − − + + + < . From appendix I, 
1
D
b
P
b
∗
∗
Π
Π
<
 , then ( )α β γ, >  ( )α β γ, .  
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laboratory at a lower cost. We call "predatory" merger a "delayed" merger for which 
pseudo-generics production has been decided exclusively for a merger motive. This 
means that the "predatory" merger takes place for a range of demand parameters which 
excludes the pseudo-generics production when mergers are not considered (see section 
4.1). We deduce from this:  
 
Proposition 3  For 2 ( ) ( )α α β γ α β γ ∈ , , ,  , if pseudo-generics are produced, it is 
with the sole purpose of inciting a "predatory" merger.  
 
Proof. We show that 2 ( ) ( )α β γ α β γ, < ,  for 212 2( )β γ> +  (see appendix K).    
 
We saw, in a framework in which mergers strategies are not considered (section 
4.1), that the brand-name firm has no incentive to produce pseudo-generic goods when 
the price-sensitivity for the brand-name product is weak (α <  ( )α β γ, ). However, the 
"delayed" merger possibility modifies this incentive because the brand-name firm 
produces pseudo-generic goods even if its profits fall. Indeed, the duopoly profit is 
larger than the pseudo-duopoly profit. Nevertheless, this production allows the brand-
name firm to buy the generic firm at a lower price. In the same manner as the predatory 
pricing studies, the predatory strategy induces a temporary drop in profits. Thus, there is 
a credibility problem of the predatory strategy. But, as suggested by Saloner (1987), 
notably by assuming sunk costs, the credibility problem disappears. In our model, such 
an assumption would not modify qualitatively the results. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 28 
This "predatory" merger is preferred to the "standard" merger under the 
proposition 1 conditions. Obviously, it is also preferred to the status quo (because the 
"standard" merger dominates the status quo). Thus, the brand-name firm, when 
2 ( ) ( )α β γ α α β γ, < < , , is ready to sacrifice its duopoly profit for its pseudo-duopoly 
profit, with the aim of acquiring the generic firm at a lower cost.  
From a policy perspective, the absence of consumer surplus analysis in our paper 
does not allow us to propose recommendations. However, we can anticipate some 
implications. Obviously, in the absence of efficiency gains, as it is the case in our 
model, mergers should be blocked. Our model indicates that the pseudo-generics 
production must be considered by competition authorities as a potential merger signal. 
More exactly, if demand parameters are such that firms have incentives to produce 
pseudo-generics when they do not consider mergers ( ( )α α β γ> , ), the pseudo-generics 
production is not a merger signal. We can even consider that if ( )α β γ, <  ( )α α β γ< ,  
and that ( )δ δ α β γ< , , , the "delayed" merger strategies do not exist. On the other hand, 
if the demand parameters are such that a "predatory" merger is practicable 
( 2 ( ) ( )α β γ α α β γ, < < , ), the pseudo-generics production surely signals a merger. 
Indeed, no other strategy could justify such a production because pseudo-duopoly 
profits are less important than duopoly profits.  
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Our paper analyzes mergers in pharmaceutical markets. More exactly, we prove 
that the pseudo-generics’ production may be a means towards a lower cost merger. 
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Indeed, this strategy reduces the purchase price of the generic company. We modelize 
an industry in which a brand-name firm and a generic firm compete à la Cournot. 
Brand-name and generic goods are considered as imperfect substitutes. This model 
presents a two-stage non-cooperative game. At each stage, the brand-name firm can 
purchase its generic competitor. But, at the first stage, the brand-name firm can decide 
to produce pseudo-generics instead. In this framework, the generic laboratory is a 
Stackelberg leader on the generic market where two homogeneous goods are available: 
generic and pseudo-generic products.  
Three results emerge. First, without pseudo-generics, the brand-name producer 
always monopolizes the market. Second, pseudo-generics production may delay the 
takeover. Indeed, under some conditions, the "delayed" merger dominates the first 
period merger. Third, the brand-name company can produce pseudo-generics solely to 
monopolize the industry, even if it is not profitable at first. This strategy can be seen as 
a predation strategy. Indeed, under some market conditions, the pseudo-generics 
production reduces the brand-name firm’s profit, but this firm nevertheless decides to 
produce pseudo-generics in order to reduce the purchase price of the generic 
manufacturer. Two conditions must be satisfied to ensure the profitability of this 
strategy: the loss due to the pseudo-generics production over a period, must not be too 
significant. This is the case if the products are differentiated enough i.e if the pseudo-
duopoly is not too unfavourable. Moreover, the discounted value of the gain relative to 
the reduction in the purchase price must be high enough. But, the higher product 
differentiation is, the lower the rate of discount can be.  
From a policy perspective, the absence of studies on consumer surplus in our 
paper does not allow us to propose recommendations. However, we can anticipate some 
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implications. Obviously, in the absence of efficiency gains, as it is the case in our 
model, mergers should be blocked. Nevertheless, we should note that firms always 
benefit from mergers. Thus, they can spend more for R&D. This may compensate the 
consumer surplus decrease due to mergers. First, our model indicates the pseudo-
generics production must be considered by competition policy as a potential merger 
signal. On the other hand, the competition authorities must not neglect the fact that the 
pseudo-generics entry increases consumer surplus because of the increased competition. 
Moreover, the consumer surplus analysis is interesting for another reason. Kong and 
Seldon (2004) show that barriers to entry are created due to the pseudo-generics 
production. This anti-competitive practice reduces consumer surplus. In our study, 
generics are present in the industry before pseudo-generics. The latter facilitate mergers 
and we may think they decrease consumer surplus. Therefore, such a consumer surplus 
analysis could result in the prohibition of pseudo-generic products and should constitute 
the main direction for future research. 
 
 
Appendix A (duopoly): 
 
Competition à la Cournot between the two firms.  
The firms simultaneously maximize their profit functions: 
 
 (1 )Dg g g g b gp q q q qβ γΠ = = − − .  (A.1) 
 
 (1 )Db b b b g bp q q q qα γΠ = = − − .  (A.2) 
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The first order condition (FOC) of the generic laboratory requires that: 
 
 (1 ) 0
D
g
g b g
g
q q q
q
β γ β∂Π = − − − =
∂
 (A.3) 
 ( )1( ) 1
2g b b
q q qγβ⇒ = − − .  
 
The FOC of the brand-name laboratory requires that: 
 
 (1 ) 0
D
b
b g b
b
q q q
q
α γ α∂Π = − − − =
∂
 (A.4) 
 ( )1( ) 12b g gq q qγα⇒ = − − .  
 
The equilibrium outputs are given by solving the following system:  
 
 
( )
( )
1 1
2
1 1
2
g b
b g
q q
q q
γβ
γ
α

= − −


= − −

 (A.5) 
 
Appendix B (multiproduct monopoly): 
 
The monopoly chooses simultaneously its two quantities in order to maximize its 
profit function. 
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M
b b b g gp q p qΠ = +  (B.1) 
 (1 ) (1 ) )b g b g b gq q q q q qα γ β γ= − − + − − .  
 
The FOC 1 gives us the response function in brand-name output: 
 
 ( )12 1 2 0 ( ) 2 12
M
b
b g b g g
b
q q q q q
q
α γ γ
α
∂Π
= − + − = ⇒ = − − .
∂
 (B.2) 
 
The FOC 2 gives us the response function in pseudo-generic output: 
 
 ( )12 2 1 0 ( ) 2 1
2
M
b
b g g b b
g
q q q q q
q
γ β γβ
∂Π
= − − + = ⇒ = − − .
∂
 (B.3) 
 
The equilibrium outputs are given by solving the following system:  
 
 
( )
( )
1 2 1
2
1 2 1
2
g b
b g
q q
q q
γβ
γ
α

= − −


= − −

 (B.4) 
 
Appendix C (monoproduct monopoly): 
 
If α γ< , the monopoly produces only the brand-name product. Therefore, it 
maximizes the following profit function: 
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 (1 )MMb b b b bp q q qαΠ = = − .  (C.1) 
 
The FOC give us the equilibrium brand-name output: 
 
10 1 2 0
2
MM
MMb
b b
b
q q
q
α
α
∗∂Π
= ⇒ − = ⇒ = .
∂
 (C.2) 
 
Appendix D (merger incentive): 
   
Case 1: 2
γα γ ∈ ,  : 
 
 ( ) MM D Db g bF α β γ ∗ ∗ ∗, , = Π − Π − Π  (D.1) 
 
2 2 3
2 2
1 (2 )(8 12 2 )
4 (4 )
α γ βα αβγ αγ γ
α αβ γ
− − + +
= − .
−
 
 
 
( ( )) ( ( ))sign F sign fα β γ α β γ, , = − , ,  with: 
 
2 2 3( ) 8 ( 12 2 )f α β γ βα βγ γ α γ, , = + − + + .  (D.2) 
 
( )f α β γ, ,  is a trinomial in α .  
( ) 0f α β γ, , ≤  for 2γα γ ∈ ,  . Thus, the merger is profitable in this first case since 
( ) 0F α β γ, , ≥  for 2γα γ ∈ ,  .  
 
Case 2: [ [α γ β∈ , : 
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 ( ) M D Db g bF α β γ ∗ ∗ ∗, , = Π − Π − Π  (D.3) 
 
2 2 2 3 2 2
22 2
4 5 16 2 4 51
4 4
γ αβ βγ αβγ γ α β αγ
αβ γ αβ γ
 
 
 
   
   
   
+ − − + +
= .
− −
 
 
( ( )) ( ( ))sign F sign nα β γ α β γ, , = , ,  with: 
 
2 2 2 2 3( ) 4 4 16 5 5 2n α β γ α β β γβ γ α β γ γ  
 
, , = + − + + − .  (D.4) 
 
( )n α β γ, ,  is a trinomial in α .  
( ) 0n α β γ, , ≥  for [ [α γ β∈ , . Thus, the merger is profitable in this second case 
since ( ) 0F α β γ, , ≥  for [ [α γ β∈ , .  
 
Appendix E (pseudo-duopoly case): 
 
A Cournot-Stackelberg competition takes place between the two firms. These 
firms maximize the following profits:  
 
 (1 ( ) )Pg g pg b gq q q qβ γΠ = − + − .  (E.1) 
 
 (1 ( )) (1 ( ) )Pb b g pg b g pg b pgq q q q q q q qα γ β γΠ = − − + + − + − .  (E.2) 
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The generic firm is a Stackelberg leader on its market. Then, we determine the 
( )b gRF q q, , the reaction function in pseudo-generic products:  
 
 2 1 ( ) 0
P
b
b pg g pg
pg
q q q q
q
γ β β∂Π = − − + − + =
∂
 (E.3) 
 
2 11( )
2
b g
pg b g
q q
q RF q q
γ β
β
− +
⇒ = , = − .  
 
Substituting ( )b gRF q q,  in the two profit functions, we obtain: 
 
 
1 (1 )
2
P
g g gq qβΠ = − .  (E.4) 
 
 
2 2 2 2( ) ( ) 2 11
4
b b g gP
b
q q q qγ αβ β γ β β
β
− + − + − +
Π = .  (E.5) 
 
The brand-name and generic equilibrium outputs are given by solving the FOC 
system:  
 
 
2
2
1 10
2 2
11 2 2 0 24
P
g P
g g
g
P
Pb bb b
b
q q
q
qq q
q
β β
β γ
γ γ β αβ αβ γβ
∗
∗ 
 
 
 ∂Π 
= − = = ∂ 
⇒ 
−∂Π 
=
= − + − = 
−∂
 (E.6) 
 
Substituting Pgq
∗
 and Pbq
∗
 into ( )b gRF q q, , we deduce pseudo-generic equilibrium 
output:  
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2
2
1 2
.
4 ( )
P
pgq
αβ γβ γ
β αβ γ
∗ − +
=
−
 (E.7) 
 
Appendix F (cost and gain study): 
 
1) ( )c β  analysis:  
 
We have that : 
 
3( )
16
c β β= .  (F.1) 
 
( ) 0c β > , β∀   
 
2) ( )g α β γ δ, , ,  analysis: 
 
 
( )2 22 2
2 2
4 8 21( )
8 (4 ) ( 1)g
αβ γ δ β α γ
α β γ δ β αβ γ δ
 
 
 
− − −
, , , = .
− −
 (F.2) 
 
 
( )22
22
8 2( ) 0 for ( )
4
g
β α γ
α β γ δ δ α β γ
αβ γ  
 
−
, , , = , , = .
−
 (F.3) 
 
Note that we study ( )g α β γ δ, , ,  only for [ [0 1δ ∈ , .  
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 ( )
2 2 2 2 4 2 2
2 22
16 32 8 8( ) 1
8 4 1
g β α β γ βγ α γ β γα β γ δ
δ αβ γ β δ
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ − + − +∂ , , ,
= .
∂
− −
 (F.4) 
( ) 2 2 2 2 4 2 2( ) (16 32 8 8 )gsign signα β γ δδ β α β γ βγ α γ β γ∂ , , ,   ∂  = + − + − +   
2 2 2 2 4 2 216 32 8 8β α β γ βγ α γ β γ  
 
+ − + − +  is a trinomial in α . Its determinant is 
( )22 2128 2 0β γ β γ− > .  
This trinomial admits two roots:  
 
2 2 2 3 41 1
4 4
1
8 8 2( ) βγ γ β γ βγ γα β γ β
− − − +
, = ,  (F.5) 
 
2 2 2 3 41 1
4 4
2
8 8 2( ) βγ γ β γ βγ γα β γ β
− + − +
, = .  
 
Remark: 
 1( ) ( )Aα β γ β γ, − ,  (F.6) 
 
( )24 3 2 21 0
4
β γ γ γ β γ
β
− + − −
= < .  
 
Therefore, the zone with ] ]1( )α α β γ∈ −∞, ,  is excluded from the study zone of the 
"delayed" mergers because the pseudo-generic can not be produced when ( )Aα β γ< , .  
 
-Conclusion: two cases are possible 
 
In the case where 2 ( )α α β γ< , ,  then ( )g α β γ δ, , ,  is decreasing in δ , and 
( ) 0g α β γ δ, , , =  for ( )δ δ α β γ= , , . Note that ( ) 1δ α β γ, , <  for 2 ( )α α β γ< , . When δ  
 38 
is near to 1, ( )g α β γ δ, , ,  tends towards −∞ . Therefore, ( ) 0g α β γ δ, , , ≥  for 
0 ( )δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,   and ( ) 0g α β γ δ, , , <  for ( ) 1δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,  .  
 
In the case where 2 ( )α α β γ> , ,  then ( )g α β γ δ, , ,  is increasing in δ , and 
( ) 0g α β γ δ, , , =  for ( )δ δ α β γ= , , . Note that ( ) 1δ α β γ, , >  for 2 ( )α α β γ> , . When δ  
is near to 1, ( )g α β γ δ, , ,  tends towards +∞ . Therefore, ( ) 0g α β γ δ, , , >  for [ ]0 1δ ∈ , .  
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Appendix G (study of the difference between 
"delayed" merger incentive and "standard" merger 
incentive): 
 
The difference between cost and gain associated to "delayed" merger relative to 
"standard" merger is given by:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )S g cα β γ δ α β γ δ β, , , = , , , −  (G.1) 
 ( ) ( )
2 2 2 4
22
16 8
16 4 1
α β αβγ γ δ
γ αβ β δ
 
 
 
− +
=
− −
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 ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 4
22
16 64 24 16 3
16 4 1
α β αβ γ αβγ β γ γ
γ αβ β δ
 
 
 
− + + −
+ .
− −
 
 
As ( )c β  is independent from δ , ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  variation is the same than 
( )g α β γ δ, , ,  variation. Indeed, ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  is a monotonous transformation of the 
( )g α β γ δ, , ,  function.  
( ) 0S α β γ δ, , , =  for: 
 
 
2 2 2 2 4 2 2
22
16 64 24 3 16( )
4
β α β γ βγ α γ β γ
δ α β γ
αβ γ
     
     
     
 
 
 
− + − + −
, , = .
−
 (G.2) 
 
( ) 1δ α β γ, , =  for 1( )α β γ,  and 2 ( )α β γ, .  
 
Same manner as for ( )δ α β γ, , , we deduce that ( ) 1δ α β γ, , >  for 2 ( )α α β γ< ,  
and ( ) 1δ α β γ, , <  for 2 ( )α α β γ> , .  
 
- Conclusion: two cases are possible  
 
If 2 ( )α α β γ< , , then ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  is decreasing in δ  and tends towards −∞  
when δ  tends towards 1. As ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  does not admit a root in this case, we can 
affirm that ( ) 0S α β γ δ, , , < . This means that the "standard" merger is always preferred 
to the "delayed" merger for these parameters values. The "standard" merger being 
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always advantageous, then one will have always this merger type at the Nash 
equilibrium.  
 
 
If 2 ( )α α β γ> ,  (possible only for 212 2( )β γ> + ), then ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  is increasing 
with δ  and when δ  tends towards 1, ( )S α β γ δ, , ,  tends towards +∞ . ( ) 0S α β γ δ, , , =  
for ( )δ δ α β γ= , , . We deduce that ( ) 0S α β γ δ, , , ≥  for ( ) 1δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,   . Therefore, 
the "delayed" merger is the Nash equilibrium of the game. On the contrary, if 
0 ( )δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,   , the "standard" merger is the Nash equilibrium.  
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Two Nash equilibria are possible according to the values of demand and 
actualization parameters.  
 
Remark: Note that, if 2( ) ( )α β γ α α β γ, > > ,  (only possible if 212 2( )β γ> + ) and 
if ( ) 1δ δ α β γ ∈ , , ,   , the brand-name firm produces pseudo-generics in a first time then 
purchases the generic firm in a second time. At first, the generic firm adapts its generic 
output because of the pseudo-generics production, then accepts to be sold at a price 
equal to its pseudo-duopoly profit.  
 
Appendix H (static comparative analysis): 
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A discounted rate superior to the treshold ( )δ α β γ, ,  is a necessary condition to 
the "delayed" merger.  
 
 
2 2 2 2 4 2 2
22
16 64 24 3 16( )
4
β α β γ βγ α γ β γ
δ α β γ
αβ γ
     
     
     
 
 
 
− + − + −
, , = .
−
 (H.1) 
 
( )( )
( )
2
32
64 2 2( )
4
0γ γ α γ β βδ α β γα γ αβ
− −∂ , ,
∂
−
= <  for 2
γα > . As 2 2( ) γα β γ, >  and ( )δ α β γ, ,  is defined 
for 2 ( )α α β γ> , , then ( ) 0δ α β γα∂ , ,∂ <  for the range of parameters values concerning 
"delayed" mergers.  
( )
( )
22
32
2( )
4
32 0γ γ αδ α β γβ γ αββ
−∂ , ,
∂
−
= − > .  
( )
( ) ( )
2
32
2( ) 2
4
32 4 4 0β γ αδ α β γγ γ αβ γ αγ αβ
−∂ , ,
∂
−
= − + >  for 2
γα > . As 2 2( ) γα β γ, >  and 
( )δ α β γ, ,  is defined for 2 ( )α α β γ> , , then ( ) 0δ α β γγ∂ , ,∂ <  for the range of parameters 
values concerning "delayed" mergers.  
 
Appendix I (discounted rate neutrality): 
 
We showed in appendix H that ( ( )) 0δ α β γα
∂ , ,
∂ <  for 2 ( )α α β γ> , .  
( ) 0δ α β γ, , =  for ( )2 214( ) 2 3 3 8 4 3βα β γ γ γ βγ βγ, = − − + − +  and 
( )2 214( ) 2 3 3 8 4 3βα β γ γ γ βγ βγ, = − + − − .  
( ) 0α β γ, >  and ( ) 0α β γ, >   
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Moreover, ( ) ( )2 2 4 3 4 2 2 3 212 4( ) ( ) 0
β γ
βα β γ α β γ γ − − + + − +, − , = >  and 
( ) ( )2 2 4 3 4 2 2 3 21
2 4( ) ( ) 0
β γ
βα β γ α β γ γ + + − + +, − , = − < .  
Therefore, in the "delayed" merger zone (i.e 2 ( )α α β γ> , ), ( )δ α β γ, ,  is 
decreasing in α  and ( ) 0δ α β γ, , =  for ( )α α β γ= , .  
 
Appendix J (comparison of the two structures): 
 
To simplify the comparison, we analyze the ratio 
D
b
P
b
∗
∗
Π
Π
 rather than the difference 
D P
b b
∗ ∗Π − Π .  
 
 
2 2
2 2 2 2
16 (2 ) ( )Let (4 ) ( 4 8 3 )
D
b
P
b
αβ αβ γ αβ γ
αβ γ αβ β γβ γ
∗
∗
Π − −
= ,
Π − + − +
 (J.1) 
 
 
if 1 then
For ( )
2
if 1 then
D
D Pb
b bP
b
D
D Pb
b bP
b
A γα β γ
∗
∗ ∗
∗
∗
∗ ∗
∗
 Π
> , Π > Π , Π
> , > 
Π < , Π < Π .
 Π
 (J.2) 
 
Thus, two zones appear: 
 
 
( ) where
2
( ) where
D P
b b
P D
b b
γ
α α β γ
α α β γ
∗ ∗
∗ ∗
 
∈ , , Π > Π ,  
 ∈ , ,+∞ Π > Π . 
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Appendix K ("predatory" merger): 
 
We showed in appendix J that ( )R α β γ, ,  is concave for ( )Aα β γ> , . ( )R α β γ, ,  
admits a maximum for 2 21max 12( ) 16 6 160 57 192βα β γ γ β γ β γ βγ   
 
, = − − + + + −  with 
max( ) ( ) ( )A β γ α β γ α β γ, < , < , .  
If 2 max( ) ( ) 0α β γ α β γ, − , <  then 2 max( ) ( )α β γ α β γ, < ,  because 2 ( ) 0α β γ, > .  
Let us show that 2 max( ) ( ) 0α β γ α β γ, − , < .  
( )( )2 2 212 max 12( ) ( ) 160 192 57 3 4 3 2 2βα β γ α β γ γ β βγ γ γ βγ γ γ β, − , = − + + − + −
  
2 max( ( ) ( )) 0α β γ α β γβ
∂ , − ,
∂ >  for ( )Aα β γ> , .  
The "delayed" mergers imply that 212 2( )β γ> +  (see proposition 2).  
If 3 2
4 2 2
( )β γ −
−
> , then 2 ( ) ( ) ( )Aα β γ β γ α β γ, < , < , .  
If 2 3 212 2 4 2 2( ) ( )γ β γ −−+ < < , then 2 max( ) ( ) 0α β γ α β γ, − , <  because, for 
3 2
4 2 2
( )β γ −
−
= , 2 max( ) ( ) 0α β γ α β γ, − , <  and because 2 max( ( ) ( )) 0α β γ α β γβ∂ , − ,∂ >  for 
( )Aα β γ> , . Therefore 2 ( ) ( )α β γ α β γ, < ,  for 212 2( )β γ> + .  
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